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THE GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER? RANGATIRATANGA 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 1987-1990 
A INTRODUCTION 
"Maori people have often unknowingly been confined by 
Pakeha definitions of sovereignty and legal rights, so that 
their traditional concepts of authority and rangatiratanga 
and have been subservient to the sanction and control of 
the~Pakeha legal system." (1) 
The 1987-1990 review of local government was intended to 
rationalise arrangements for the structure and conduct of 
business of local authorities, to whom were to be delegated 
sweeping responsibilities for the exercise of Crown powers 
of resource management and regulation, under the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
That Act has been widely and internationally advertised as 
a major advance in th~ treatment of indigenous interests in 
the management of natural resources. (2) A review of the 
outputs of New Zealand political and legal institutions 
provides dramatic support for such sentiments - since the 
mid-eighteenth Century, legislative provisions dealing 
posTEively with the interests of Maori and the Treaty of 
Waitangi are, for the most part, conspicuously absent. (3) 
In a relentlessly positivist legal system, this 
invisibility ensured that Maori and Treaty interests were 
disregarded in economic, political and regulatory 
decisions. In this regard, the Maori and Treaty provisions 
of the Resource Management Act (4) constitute a substantial 
improvement in the position of Maori in statutory resource 
management. However, the Act is designed to operate through 
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the reform which resulted from the concurrent local 
government review - 13 Regional Councils, 1 Unitary and 79 
Territorial Authorities, whose empowerment statute fails to 
acknowledge either the status of the tangata whenua or the 
significance of the Treaty to the operation of local 
government. 
In this context, the interests of the tangata whenua (5) 
are subsumed to a regime whose infrastructure is 
inconsistent with Maori aspirations for the recognition of 
te tino rangatiratanga. In the absence of a resource base 
for Maori decision-making reflecting Maori priorities, in 
structural and practical terms, such advances as are made 
by the Resource Management Act can be, at best, interim 
so-1-a:tions. 
This paper considers the treatment of the Crown's 
obligations to Maori interests under the Treaty of Waitangi 
during the process of local government reform, particularly 
the failure to meet Maori expectations for the recognition 
of their status as tangata whenua and the advancement of 
their interests. It reviews the implications of this 
failure for the administration of the Resource Management 
Act 1991, and, briefly, considers how well the provisions 
of that Act substitute for adequate structural arrangements 
for the recognition of te tino rangatiratanga. 
"Mana, mana ebbs and flows, especially mana tangata. Mana 
is given and it is taken away. It can never be assumed, but 
we-can only know we have mana as it is reflected in the 
behaviour of others." (6) 
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B APPLICATION OF THE TREATY TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
"The tangata whenua had adopted a structure based in 
---i:: -
essence on local responsibility. The whanau, hapu and iwi 
structure of government recognised local responsibility and 
it was not until the late nineteenth century the Maori 
people attempted to institute a centralised structure via a 
federation of iwi. " ( 7) 
"It is our submission that local government has been a 
major influence in the development of democracy and 
democratic values in New Zealand and that democracy should 
continue to be its raison d'etre. In this respect, 
restructuring local government is not the same as 
restructuring central government administration; the civil 
and democratic rights of the citizen are at stake. " (8) 
The local government reform saw the expression of two ·-conflicting views of the place of local government, the 
first of which acknowledges the political and historic role 
of the institution in the development of democratic 
government, and that the "first tentative steps toward 
democracy started at the local level and thus local 
government was parent to central government " . (9) 
By the same token, local government had progressively lost 
its original role as population and communications 
increased and the interrelationships between different 
policies and activities became more defined. In fact, the 
term "local government" had become a virtual misnomer in 
the face of the delegated statutory mandate conferred by 
parliament. In the modern reality, local government can be 
sai9-_to be a mere creature of statute, exercising only 
those powers and functions that have been delegated to them 
by the Crown, The task of the local government review 
would, on the basis of this perception of the place of 
local government, be concerned with determining what 
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functions could appropriately be delegated from the central 
level, and the form of the agencies which would fulfil 
those functions. 
From its origins, however, local government in New Zealand 
has meant elected government, with a distinct constituency 
and financial base. The mandate of the local electorate has 
- ('),. -
served to ensure that, while central government has the 
legal capacity to impose and enforce change, "long 
established conventions of consultation and consent" (10) 
Although strictly speaking, local authorities cannot be 
considered to be agents of the Crown under present legal 
tests, due to their (limited) constitutional and financia l 
independence, it should be noted that the criteria 
developed for such tests may not apply to the range and 
extent of powers and functions presently under delegation . 
(11) 
The resulting uncertainty about the constitutional position 
of local authorities raises significant questions 
co~rning the application of the Treaty to local 
government affairs. 
The Waitangi Tribunal has determined that Article I of the 
Treaty conferred on the Crown the right to make laws for 
peace and good order and to protect Maori mana. (12) The 
first enabled the Crown to meet its obligations to meet the 
needs of the general public. The latter created an 
obligation on the Crown to exercise its power so as not to 
derogate from the interests protected in Article II. 
Although the power conferred on the Crown must necessarily 
be extensive, (13) it is not an unlimited right. Each of 
the things exchanged in the Treaty was intended to act as a 
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limit on the other, requiring a balance to be effected in 
the event of conflict between the interests represented by 
the two Articles. 
"The cession of sovereignty or kawanatanga enables the 
Crown to make laws for conservation control, resource 
protection being in everyone's interests. These laws may 
need to apply to all alike. But this right is to be 
exercised in light of Article II or the authority of the 
tribes to exercise control. In short, sovereignty is said 
to-be limited by the right reserved in Article II. It 
follows that the Treaty fishing interests should not be 
qualified except to the extent necessary to conserve the 
resource." (14) 
In Treaty terms, to the extent that the Crown has delegated 
certain of its law making or regulatory capacity, the 
powers and functions exercised by local authorities are 
expressions of kawanatanga conferred by Article I. The 
Waitangi Tribunal has suggested that the Treaty reaches 
beyond the Crown to those whose jurisdiction is derived 
from the Article I power. (15) The Treaty obliges the Crown 
to ensure that appropriate arrangements are made to uphold 
tribal rangatiratanga in the delegation of its law making 
powers and to empower the agencies receiving that 
derc-gation with, the legislative capacity to uphold the 
Treaty guarantees. 
"The concept of Te Tino Rangatiratanga is central to Maori 
understanding of what the Treaty is all about - Authority 
rather than subordination, and the right to possess what is 
their's and to control and manage resources in accordance 
with their own preferences. Te Tino Rangatiratanga is not 
necessarily even about 'partnerships'. It is a concept 
denoting full authority and man.a." (16) 
-6-
Rangatiratanga has been held (17) to incorporate aspects 
which include: 
- the power to control and manage resources in accordance 
with Maori preferences and Maori customary practices; 
- full authority with respect to Maori possessions and 
other interests; 
- tribal self-management on terms similar to those applied 
to local government. 
The authority of rangatiratanga and the responsibilities o f 
kai t iakitanga are intrinsically linked. Without adequate 
power and authority Maori have no secure basis on which to 
fulfil their cultural and spiritual responsibilities. The 
existence of legal, political or economic impediments to 
the institutional ability of Maori to exercise their 
responsibilities to the natural world and future 
generations does not absolve them from these 
responsibilities nor ameliorate the cultural and spiritual 
harm suffered in consequence of failure to act. (18) 
From the Maori perspective, the experience of 
disenfranchisement has only served to deepen aspirations 
for the reinstatement of Maori in the role they consider to 
be their natural entitlement as the tangata whenua, that of 
decision-maker, manager and protector, the self-same role 
wh~ch government had progressively devolved to local 
government in contradiction of the Treaty. 
Rangatiratanga cannot be said to mean the right to govern 
for all, as that is the power reserved to the Crown 
pursuant to Article I. Accordingly the Crown may delegate 
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such of its powers and functions to other agents as it 
deems necessary to achieve good governance. (19) Instead, 
rangatiratanga attaches to interests and resources of 
importance to Maori, whose concern with policies and plans 
dealing with the interests and resources of others should 
reasonably extend only to ensuring they do not interfere 
with or impede the objectives of iwi for their taonga. 
Amongst the principles to be considered with respect to the 
application of the Treaty to local government were those 
emerging from the deliberations of the Court of Appeal and 
the Waitangi Tribunal. (20) As summarised by Matunga and 
Campbell (21) at the time of the reform, these principles 
included: 
- Customary concepts and institutions of authority should 
be accommodated in modern government and public decision-
making about the use of the resources of the land; 
- The right of Maori to possess what is theirs and to 
control and manage in accordance with their preferences and 
perceptions; 
- That Pakeha and Maori Treaty partners act towards each 
other reasonably and with the utmost good faith; 
.-,. 
- The Crown cannot divest itself of Treaty obligations or 
confer an inconsistent jurisdiction on others. The Crown 
should provide for its Treaty promises when vesting any 
responsibilities in local authorities; 
- The nature of a good partnership includes not only an 
obligation to actively protect Maori interests in their 
lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable, but the 
obligation to redress past breaches of the Treaty; 
-8-
- The Treaty is meant to provide a direction for future 
growth and development . It isn't inconsistent with the 
Treaty that the Crown and Maori agree upon a measure of 
compromise. This is consistent with the principle of 
partnership. 
It _~qst be acknowledged that some of these principles were 
beyond the capacity of local government to effect, notably 
those relating to redress for Treaty breaches. However, 
this did not limit the Crown's responsibilities in the 
review. The question to be considered was how the Crown's 
obligations to uphold Maori mana over their resources could 
be most effectively met in the context of the reform of 
local government. As the nature of the reform was a 
consideration of institutional arrangements, it was on 
these that Maori aspirations for their Treaty rights were 
to centre. 
"[Local government reform} presents a chance to redress 
years of neglect. It provides an opportunity to bring the 
other Treaty partner - the iwi - into their rightful, 
cen~xal position in local government, with an equitable and 
just share of power and influence. It provides an 
opportunity to look at what the Treaty means in modern 
terms for local' government and how Te Tino Rangatiratanga 
can be established." (22) 
C THE REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
1 Introduction 
"The structural relationship that exists between Maori as 
tangata whenua and Pakeha who colonised New Zealand 150 
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years ago, is one of social, economic and political 
subjugation to the tyranny of majority rule. If there is a 
resource to be returned, power to be allocated, or finance 
to be guaranteed for some Maori initiative that would alter 
the structural relationship, then the transaction is 
limited or curtailed in a manner designed to maintain Maori 
subordination. Essentially, the coloniser decides and the 
colonised responds within the stultifying and suffocating 
parameters set." (23) 
In December 1987, the Labour Government announced a 
comprehensive review of the structure and operation of the 
local government sector. (24) The principles of the review 
included decentralising decision-making and service 
delivery away from central government through increased 
delegation to regional and local communities. The 
government acknowledged that the review was overdue (25) 
and would need to cover the entire range of issues relating 
to organisation, funding, functions and accountability. 
2 The Background to Reform 
Twelve years after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
the Constitution Act 1852 was enacted, establishing a 
central government under a system of limited franchise and 
a sQt of six provincial councils with responsibility for 
administering local affairs. The Act recognised tribal 
rangatiratanga over their lands by allowing: 
"[The] setting apart of districts in which the laws, 
customs and usages of the Aboriginal or Maori inhabitants 
of New Zealand should for the present be maintained of 
themselves, in all their relations to and dealings with 
each other." (26) 
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Matunga notes (27) that this provision was never 
implemented, nor was its intent carried over on enactment 
of the Maori Representation Act 1967 establishing the four 
Maori electoral seats. 
Between 1876 and 1960, a number of reviews and inquiries 
into the business of local government (28) consistently 
failed to acknowledge the status of Maori as tangata whenua 
or the rights guaranteed under the Treaty. 
Between the arrival of the first European settlers and the 
1975 Maori Land March, Maori had been alienated from all 
but 2.5 million acres of the 66 million acres of land which 
they had originally controlled. The rate of alienation 
showed no sign of slowing, (29) where existing legislation 
afforded more opportunities for land seizure. Mounting 
protest at the continuing alienation culminated in the Land 
March coordinated by Te Roopu o te Matakite, a "show of 
solidarity" (30) that encouraged the government to act. 
As a direct result of the mounting political protests, the 
government established the first comprehensive and enduring 
forum for resolution of Maori land and resource grievances 
arising out of breaches of the Treaty, in the form of the 
Waitangi Triburial. (31) The Tribunal succeeded a range of 
one-off inquiries and commission prompted by Maori efforts 
to seek redress for breaches of the Treaty whose outcomes 
tended to be highly idiosyncratic and delivered little 
practical result. (32) 
The recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal are not 
binding on the government and its terms of reference and 
financial independence remain subject to political control, 
(33) 
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Initially, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was confined to 
investigating breaches occurring after 1975 with a view to 
their avoidance in the future. Inevitably, a number of the 
initial claims concerned development projects with which 
local authorities were concerned, (34) a trend which would 
continue when the jurisdiction was extended in 1985 (35) to 
date from the signing of the Treaty. (36) 
These reports emphasised that both the legislation which 
empowered them and the regulatory instruments - schemes and 
plans - produced by local government were expressions of 
kawanatanga and subject to the Treaty guarantee of te tino 
rangatiratanga. The Crown was held accountable for the 
actions taken by local authorities in breach of the Treaty 
as it had failed to legislate to oblige compliance with the 
Treaty and thus prevent the breaches from occurring . 
In a parallel development, the government was moved to seek 
the - advice of the statutory body established for 
consultation purposes! the New Zealand Maori Council 
( "NZMC II). 
The NZMC provided the government with advice on fourteen 
statutes which it considered contravened the provisions of 
the Treaty. Amongst the laws cited were the zoning 
provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, the Public 
Works Act provisions allowing the taking of land for public 
purposes, and the Rating Act's default seizure and sale 
sections, all exercised by local authorities to the 
detriment of Maori desires to retain control of their 
lands. The NZMC recommendations included review of the 
commercial potential basis for valuation on which rates 
were set, and the incorporation of Maori interests and 
representation in planning decision-making. 
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The latter recommendation resulted in the enactment of two 
significant provisions in the review of Town and Country 
Planning laws. The first established "the relationship of 
Maori and their customs and traditions with their ancestral 
lands" (37) as a matter of national importance to be 
recognised and provided for in District Schemes. This 
section, which contained the strongest duty imposed with 
res~ect to the interests of the tangata whenua for a 
century, was to receive extraordinary treatment at the 
hands of the planning courts, with restrictive 
interpretations that succeeded in greatly reducing the 
potential of the provision for promoting Maori interests. 
(38) 
The other significant provision (39) enabled the 
appointment of a representative of the local District Maori 
Council to sit on regional planning committees, a reference 
which was eventually amended (40) to allow local 
authorities to co-opt a "representative of the tangata 
whenua of the region" _ (41) to sit as an advisor on matters 
affecting Maori lands and important resources. These co-
opted members had no capacity to influence the decision 
beyo~d the proffering of advice to those with voting 
powers. Co-option of advisors places the advisor and the 
authority at ri'sk where issues of mandate and 
representation are not adequately addressed, particularly 
where authority boundaries transect those of tribal groups. 
As noted by the Royal Commission on Social Policy (42) a 
lone Maori voice is a poor mechanism for Maori input in the 
absence of support from, and accountability to, the tangata 
whenua. 
Despite the dearth of legal guidance, (43) some authorities 
had taken positive steps to provide for Maori participation 
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within the local government system. Matunga promotes (44) 
the example of the Auckland Regional Authority, (45) who, 
after strong lobbying from the tangata whenua including the 
filing of a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, decided in 1988 
to increase tangata whenua representation on the planning 
committee to two members, in recognition of the different 
tangata whenua groups in the region, and the need to 
provide for Maori protocol on representation. 
Similarly, the West Coast region established a ''partnership 
committee" comprising one-half representation from Regional 
councillors and one-half representation drawn from the 
loc~l community's tangata whenua and immigrant Maori 
groups. ( 46) 
Unfortunately, these initiatives were not duplicated at the 
territorial level. Moreover, local government activities 
extended beyond land and water use planning to the 
activities of numerous special purpose bodies such as 
harbour and catchment boards who had no statutory mandate 
to recognise Maori i1lterests. Such initiatives as were 
taken, did not reflect existing tribal structures and 
boundaries or confer any substantive rights to make 
decisions which reflected Maori values and priorities. 
"The defects of local government from a Maori perspective 
not only relate to matters of representation and the need 
to ·share power and influence in a manner which is just, 
equitable and accords with Treaty guarantees; they also 
extend to systems of local government, how they are 
administered and how they perform." (47) 
By the time of Bassett's 1987 announcement, the New Zealand 
local government and resource management system was 
fragmented and uncoordinated. More than 800 territorial and 
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special purpose authorities were engaged in administering 
22 9ore resource statutes and more than 300 related laws 
and regulations. (48) The result was ad-hoe, unwieldy, 
expensive and, most importantly, had consistently failed to 
deliver appropriate environmental outcomes. (49) 
D THE REVIEW PROCESS 
1 Introduction 
"[L}ocal government simply does not recognise Maori Te Tino 
Rangatiratanga. The current proposals for reform need to 
promulgate changes which will lead to the establishment of 
Rangatiratanga in local and regional government and 'good 
governance' for both Treaty partners." (50) 
The reform of local government took place in essentially 
three phases. In the first, the reorganisation of more than 
800 local government bodies into 13 regional, one unitary 
and 79 district councJls was accomplished through a 
restructuring scheme promulgated by the Local Government 
Commission in June 1989, in time for local body elections 
that November. Following on directly from the 
reorganisation phase, officials developed policies on the 
constitution, electoral processes and accountability of the 
reformed authorities which were incorporated into the Local 
Government Reform Act, passed in May 1989. The final phase 
comprised a fundamental review of the funding and functions 
of local government, linking with the results of reform of 
resource management law and reviews of building controls, 
occupational health and safety, pest management and 
biosecurities. 
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The announcement of the local government review was 
followed by the establishment of a "large ad-hoe cabinet 
committee" (51) to oversee both the local government and 
resource management reforms, and the Officials Co-
ordinating Committee on Local Government ("OCCLG"), drawn 
initially from Treasury, Environment, Internal Affairs, and 
the State Services and Local Government Commissions. These 
officials were responsible for most of the analytical work 
on the reform. (52) 
Maori were not represented on the OCCLG until after the 
first phase of the reform was completed, at which time 
officials from Manatu Maori and the Maruwhenua Directorate 
of the Ministry for the Environment joined the group. 
2 The First Phase Discussion Document 
In April 1988, the OCCLG published and distributed "to over 
1200 interested organisations" (53) a discussion document 
se~ting out in the broadest of terms the issues faced in 
the review and seeking answers to 108 questions posed. The 
discussion document process was extensively criticised in 
submissions complaining of the unreasonable six-week 
timetable for responding, the inconvenience and expense of 
responding in the designated format given the lack of 
resources faced by many interested groups, and the broad 
approach taken to complex issues in the document itself. 
( 54) 
The appropriateness of the process can be measured by its 
marked lack of success in attracting responses from Maori. 
Of more than 300 submissions received in the first phase of 
this process, only six were from Maori organisations. (55) 
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The discussion document identified a number of major 
principles for the reform, including the "fundamental 
significance of the Treaty of Waitangi". (56) Despite this 
apparent recognition, however, substantive comment on the 
Treaty was scant and confined to the final pages of the 
document, an indication of the significance attached to it 
by the OCCLG. 
Three issues were raised in the discussion document 
relating to the relationship between local government and 
Maori. These were: (57) 
- whether the Treaty of Waitangi should influence local 
government activities; 
- whether the local government system should accord special 
status to Maori interests; and 
- if so, what constitutional arrangements would be 
appropriate. 
The OCCLG approached the issue of Maori interests as 
emanating from the Treaty but requiring to be established 
as "special rights or needs not shared by other minority 
groups", (58) rights which the OCCLG saw as largely in 
conflict with the principles of universal franchise 
democracy. There was no reference made in the OCCLG 
material of the principle of rangatiratanga. 
Instead the document suggests that guaranteed Maori 
representation amounts to a value the benefits of which 
should be weighed against other societal values, such as 
"traditional democratic principles of open election." (59) 
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Representing the Treaty interest as a "special group" 
interest fundamentally misinterprets the status which 
should be afforded to Maori as tangata whenua. Such an 
approach immediately raises issues for many New Zealanders 
to whom the idea of a privileged group right is anathema. 
In addition, the OCCLG failed to acknowledge that Maori 
cultural preferences may dictate different processes for 
the selection of representatives. 
The OCCLG also declined to recognise the failure of 
populist democratic processes to respond positively to the 
needs and priorities of minorities, processes which ended 
with local government representatives who are: 
"* 90% men 
* 50% from a farming background 
* 100% Caucasian 
* 60% over the age of 50 
* 90% reasonably affluent 
* 75% retired or self-employed" ( 60) 
Kerins notes that Kahungunu candidates who campaigned on 
the basis of te tino rangatiratanga and the Treaty were not 
successful as their kaupapa had the effect of: 
" ... frightening Pakeha voters away. . . . No matter how 
justified Maori were to campaign under the Treaty, as it 
turned out, in doing so they were simply marginalised from 
the wider community. Simply by asserting their human right 
to be Maori, tangata whenua candidates were doomed to 
fail." (61) 
Given the misrepresentation of their interests, responses 
to the questions raised in the discussion document with 
respect to Maori were predictably polarised. Responses 
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ranged from outright rejection of the relevance of the 
Treaty, usually without reasons proffered, to extensive 
analysis of its importance and impact on all of the 
activities of local government. (62) 
On one end of this spectrum, the reaction from a number of 
local government agencies generally accorded with the view 
expressed in the following statement from the Local 
Government Association: 
"Local Government, like other parts of government, is 
required to take account of the Treaty of Waitangi. The 
fundamental attribute of responsiveness means that local 
government has acknowledged the rights and values of the 
Maori people of New Zealand. It will continue to respond to 
their needs, including developing its consultative 
mechanisms. Because of the diversity of local 
circumstances, it will not be desirable to mandate specific 
reqrr.irements in the Local Government Act." ( 6 3) 
The possibility that the responsiveness of local government 
to Maori needs and aspirations had a less than optimal 
history is not contemplated by the NZLGA. Presumably, their 
consideration of Maori interests did not go beyond the fact 
that each individual might choose to exercise their voting 
privilege to elect the representative of their choice. This 
despite the acknowledgement of other local authorities that 
the result of the majority of such elections is 
representatives who are profoundly unrepresentative. 
"Studies have revealed that all local authorities are 
elected upon a democratic process, however, the composition 
of those authorities is stacked against the inclusion of 
minority groups or disadvantaged parties. For example, 
large municipalities generally consist of business/ 
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professional people, smaller authorities of self-employed 
business people and county councils of middle-aged farmers. 
Interestingly enough very few Maoris (sic) sit on Councils 
and the opportunity for the working man to become involved 
is limited. For these reasons, the values of local 
government should be available for everyone to participate 
without creating a class structure for those elected." (64) 
The resistance of Pakeha to the incorporation of the Treaty 
in local goverrunent responsibilities was generally founded 
on a combination of inability to comprehend the negative 
impact of the present power imbalance on the interests of 
Maori, and ignorance and fear about the implications of the 
Treaty for their own interests. "Many Pakeha thought that 
under the Treaty Maori were going to strip them of their 
possessions and force them into the sea." (65) 
By contrast, submissions from Maori representatives 
emphasised the importance of the review as an opportunity 
to redress the asymmetrical power relations which the 
existing system only _served to perpetuate, but only if 
alternative models were developed which empowered Maori to 
control their own destiny and lands. 
"Electoral reform essentially evades [the issue of a Maori 
model for government) and when the chips are down it is 
tinkering with a Pakeha system, in a way which will not 
alter it, to allow the Pakeha to attain a relationship with 
the Maori specified in the Treaty of Waitangi. 11 (66) 
Although a number of submissions from authorities suggested 
that local goverrunent had obligations to act to increase 
Maori input through co-opting representatives on to 
committees and encouraging more to stand for election, 
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these solutions could not meet Maori expectations for their 
rights under the Treaty. 
"Increasing Maori representation on local and regional 
government, while desirable in itself, does not constitute 
institutionalisation of the Maori right of self-
determination." ( 67) 
Maori assertions of te tino rangatiratanga through their 
submissions to the reform were poorly dealt with by those 
responsible for analysing the results of the consultation 
process. Constrained by the approach taken by the OCCLG 
and by their own lack of understanding of the issues being 
raised by Maori, the submissions analysts effectively 
sidelined Maori interests as those of another special 
interest group, to be regarded alongside those of women and 
the elderly. (68) In respect of each of these "interest 
groups" the issue of separate or special constitutional 
arrangements was thoroughly rejected by the majority of 
respondents as discriminatory and antithetical to 
democracy. ( 6 9) 
Kelsey (70) notes that a further analysis of the Maori 
submissions was carried out under the aegis of RMLR at the 
instigation of the Environment Ministry, dissatisfied with 
the superficiaf treatment accorded them by the OCCLG. A 
substantially different picture emerged. 
"The submissions attacked the 'unacceptable monocultural 
basis permeating the existing system of central and local 
government', the inadequacy of current democratic processes 
to ensure equal Maori representation, and the lack of 
effective and equal sharing of power between Maori and 
Pakeha at all levels." ( 71) 
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Th~_9ccLG submissions analysts failed to appreciate that 
the common factor in assertions made throughout submissions 
from Maori groups was the principle of te tino 
rangatiratanga, variously expressed as local self-
government and self-determination (72) the right to control 
use and development decisions affecting Maori lands 
(including rating, planning, health and building 
regulation), (73) an equal share of decision-making power, 
(74) and institutional arrangements which reflected Maori 
cultural preferences for government. (75) 
Other issues of considerable significance to Maori were 
barely touched by the OCCLG submissions analysis. Of 
particular import was the matter of the boundaries to be 
drawn for the reformed authorities. At the time of the 
review the situation with respect to local government 
boundaries was chaotic, accurately described by Bridgeport 
(76) as a "mish-mash". Traditionally, size and boundaries 
for local authorities had been determined according to the 
appropriate community of interest to be represented, a 
somewhat intangible concept whose meaning and application 
in any given circumstance varied considerably depending on 
differing definitions as to the nature of the appropriate 
interest. In the review, communities of interest were 
identified around geographical and socio-economic factors 
such as land use patterns, cultural and historical 
interests, population distribution and a more amorphous 
sense of community. (77) 
Maori submissions expressed strong support for 
consideration to be given to iwi tribal boundaries in the 
fixing of local authority boundaries, particularly at the 
regional level. Such consideration would reflect the status 
to be accorded to Maori pursuant to the Treaty and 
ameliorate difficulties being experienced by authorities 
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and iwi with respect to overlapping boundaries and 
representation of multiple iwi groups. (78) The importance 
of this recognition in Treaty terms was missed by the 
submissions analysts who instead referred to the assertions 
as "minority views" to be disregarded as against the 
majority preference for physical characteristics, such as 
river catchments, to apply. (79) This issue was eventually 
referred to the Maori Local Government Reform Consultative 
Group for their consideration. 
As it turned out, by the time the discussion document was 
published, the first phase of the policy reform had already 
resulted in the production of a draft Local Government 
Reform Bill through which it was intended to empower the 
Local Government Commission to undertake the restructuring 
of local government and set out the criteria for that 
restructuring. In preparing the Bill in the absence of 
appropriate Maori consultation, the Government had, in 
effect, violated its own Cabinet directive (80) to ensure 
all_legislation referred to Cabinet at the policy approval 
stage should address ~he implications for recognition of 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The Local Government Commission was instructed to consult 
with the public and local government authorities, but 
retained powers of decision with respect to final 
reorganisation schemes. These schemes, eventually 
promulgated in June 1989, were to form the basis for a 
greatly reduced number of new authorities to be 
established, after local elections, on 1 November 1989. 
The adequacy of the reform process' treatment of the Treaty 
was challenged by submissions to the Select Committee 
considering the Reform Bill, with the New Zealand Maori 
COUDCil questioning how the reform could have reached 
• ........ .. 
~tance 
~rtions 
:h as 
:ually 
:ative 
: was 
tlready 
1t 
the 
:uring 
>f 
.n 
1sure 
>roval 
1 of 
1sult 
a 
:9. 
Treaty 
-23-
legislation stage without considering the impact of the 
Treaty on the structural changes proposed. (81) 
Amongst those who could be consulted by the Commission were 
such "Maori tribal bodies and other such authorities" as 
the Commission deemed were necessary to consult. (82) The 
Commission took this to oblige them to write to Maori Trust 
Boards, seeking their advice. As Kerins notes (83) these 
Boards are primarily responsible for land administration 
and ; · as such, were poorly equipped to respond to Basset's 
request for advice on the complex subject of local 
government reform. Predictably, responses from Trust Boards 
were not forthcoming, reflecting the inadequate process 
used. 
3 
( i) 
The Maori Local Government Reform Consultative 
Group 
Role and Appointment 
The specially appointed Maori Local Government Reform 
Consultative Group ("MCG") established to consider Treaty 
issues did not meet until May 1988. (84) The members of the 
MCG-were selected by the Crown without regard for the 
. , 
representation and accountability processes of Maori. Both 
issues of membership of the group and their independence 
from the then Minister of Local Government, Dr Bassett, 
were controversial. (85) 
The briefing for the MCG included the instruction that they 
had neither the mandate nor the time to conduct public 
meetings, (86) a constraint which compromised the group's 
ability to respond to the Maori preference for discursive 
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hui as the forum for decision-making, and further 
undermined their standing in the Maori world. 
" In Maori process terms, it is also debatable whether a 
Maori Consultative Committee, appointed by the 'other' 
Treaty partner, has the mana, the rangatiratanga to make 
representation on behalf of all Maoridom in this country." 
(87) 
As it happened, even the mandate conferred by the Crown to 
the MCG was severely limited. The MCG were given four main 
issues to consider, arising from submissions received 
during the OCCLG public consultation exercise: 
the application of the principles of the Treaty to 
local government activities; 
options for Maori involvement in local government; 
rating of Maori land; and 
recognition of iwi preferences in the fixing of 
boundaries. 
(ii) Principles of the Treaty? 
Following their initial deliberations, the MCG recommended 
that the government enact appropriate legislation to ensure 
that the functions of local government were carried out in 
a manner consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi. 
In referring directly to the Treaty, rather than its 
principles, this recommendation exceeded the terms of 
reference set for the MCG. Those terms of reference 
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reflected a consistent approach to the Treaty by the Crown 
since the concept was first introduced into New Zealand 
le~~slation in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
The concept of the principles of the Treaty was based on 
positive intentions. It was designed to overcome 
difficulties associated with considering the literal words 
of the Articles alone. 
The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in two texts, the English 
version signed by 39 chiefs, compared to the 500 
signatories of the Maori version. The terms of the two 
texts are not translations one of the other, and do not 
convey precisely the same meaning. (88) The concept of the 
principles allowed greater latitude in interpretation and 
avoided conflicting views as to which text was to be 
preferred. ( 89) 
The concept also recognised that the literal words of the 
Treaty's Articles assumed an ideal of equality of influence 
which had long passed-into history. 
"{I]t is an unspoken premise when one speaks of principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi that land and estates, forests, 
fisheries and other properties transferred or taken at some 
earlier time often shrouded in history were transferred or 
taken allegedly contrary to the principles of the Treaty. 
So when one speaks of the principles one is not just 
referring to the letter of the Treaty but to the events 
that have occurred since it was signed." (90) 
That the MCG declined to restrict its recommendation to the 
terms set by the Crown with regard to the principles also 
reflected a consistent position, in that Maori had 
generally rejected the concept as a unilateral redefining 
of the Treaty's terms. Maori opposition to the idea of 
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Treaty principles increased with the publication in 1989 of 
five principles on which the Crown proposed to base its 
response to obligations under the Treaty. (91) 
The use of the phrase "principles" in such a context was a 
very poor choice by the government. It created considerable 
confusion as to whether the Crown principles were to be 
preferred over those which had already been expressed by 
the Waitangi Tribunal and the Court of Appeal. 
Maori resistance to the Crown Principles was uniform, 
particularly as regards the denial of te tino 
rangatiratanga. (92) Kerins records (93) the response of 
the Kia Mohio Kia Marama Trust as typical of Maori 
reaction. 
"[The Trust} claimed the government knew that the whole 
Treaty debate centred on the right of te iwi Maori tote 
tino rangatiratanga - absolute Maori authority. But it 
simply chose to ignore that fact .... The principles have 
been seized on and made to mean the opposite of Te Tino 
Rangatiratanga." 
4 The Hui on Maori Participation in Local 
Government 
(i) Introduction 
The only significant hui concerning the application of the 
Treaty to local government was called by the Maori Local 
Government Reform Consultative Group and did not take place 
until March 1989. 
The Hui on Maori Participation in Local Government attacked 
the government's consultation performance throughout the 
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reform and recommended that the proposed legislative 
timetable be deferred until the findings of the hui had 
been adequately addressed. The role of the MCG in the 
Crown's performance of its consultation obligations 
received particular attention. 
"The process for providing for Maori participation has been 
last minute, tardy, offensive and even bizarre. The Crown 
must realise that the unsatisfactory and inaccessible 
methods used to appoint the Maori Consultative Group are 
offensive to Maori people as they usurp our rights to 
select our own representation . .. . It is noted with 
disappointment that because of self-imposed constraints 
imposed on the Maori Consultative Group of their role, 
(sic) full and effective negotiation on its part relating 
to the review based on a balanced cross-section of Maori 
opinion, carried out in a culturally appropriate manner has 
not occurred." (94) 
While criticism of the MCG needs to be seen in light of the 
intent of the hui to have its recommendations treated 
seriously by government, responsibility for the processes 
used was laid directly at the door of the Minister of Local 
Government, Dr Bassett, who was called upon to resign. (95) 
Bassett had enjoyed considerable freedom in the conduct of 
the reform, a fact which Kelsey characterises as payback 
for loyal support of the economic policies of Roger 
Douglas. (96) He was particularly resistent to the idea 
that the Treaty should be accorded status in the review. 
(ii) The recommendations 
Despite its opposition to the MCG process of consultation, 
the hui concurred with that group's initial recommendation 
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that legislation require all the structures and functions 
of local government be subject to an obligation to give 
effect to the Treaty. In addition, the hui asserted that 
providing for tangata whenua groups to appoint 50% of local 
authority representatives would effectively recognise the 
rangatiratanga of those groups over the resources important 
to them. ( 97) 
To further cement the preeminent place of the Treaty in the 
operations of local authorities, the hui proposed the 
establishment of Standing Committees in all authorities 
whose purpose would be to ensure compliance with the 
Treaty. 
"Th_f!_ Committee shall have the absolute power of veto in 
regard to any policies and activities found to contravene 
the Treaty {and] shall be made up exclusively of Maori 
members of that authority." ( 98) 
In their enthusiasm to express the prerequisites for 
rangatiratanga under ~he aegis of a local authority, the 
hui appears to have failed to note that the Treaty 
guaranteed a high priority to be afforded to Maori 
interests where these would be directly impacted but 
otherwise required a balance to be effected between the ., 
interests of both the parties. The Crown's dismal 
performance on this point notwithstanding, it would seem 
therefore unreasonable to exclude representation from one 
of the parties on a matter as significant as the 
application of the Treaty in a particular circumstance. 
In sum, the hui recommended that tangata whenua be 
empowered to carry out all powers, functions and 
responsibilities of local authorities with respect to any 
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activity affecting their people or their lands, waterways 
and other resources of significance to them. (99) 
To complement this right, and improve the capacity of local 
authorities to understand and respond to Maori cultural 
priorities, the hui recommended that each agency maintain a 
"Maori Secretariat made up of Maori Personnel with 
specialist skills" whose function was to provide 
administrative back-up for the proposed Standing Committee 
and advice to the authority on ensuring its policies and 
actions took account of the appropriate Maori protocol. 
(iii) The Minister's response 
In December 1988, the Minister of Local Government released 
a statement which defined the purposes and principles of 
local government as including: (100) 
to recognise the existence of different communities 
within New Zealand; and 
to promote the identity and values of these 
communities. 
The fundamental task for the review was to determine how 
these purposes might be achieved so as to deliver to the 
communities to be served, a system of local government 
which met their needs in an effective, meaningful and 
participatory fashion. Despite such sentiments, the efforts 
of the Hui on Maori Participation to advise the government 
on the most appropriate way to recognise and promote Maori 
and Treaty interests in the operation of local government 
were not appreciated by the Minister. 
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The December 1988 document gave no guidance as to how Maori 
interests might be dealt with in the review, merely 
announcing that the anticipated input of the MCG would be 
considering such issues. In the event, the MCG presented 
the recommendations of the hui as the basis for their 
submission. 
Its recommendations were rejected by the Cabinet Committee 
while the Minister of Local Government sought to undermine 
the Maori Consultative Group's act of solidarity, claiming 
that the group had been hijacked by activists. (101) The 
MCG submission was not, the Minister said, "the advice tha t 
I think they intended to give us." (102) 
E 
1 
THE BILL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF MAORI ADVISORY 
COMMITTEES 
Introduction 
In the event, however~ the government belatedly responded 
to the pressure for recognition of te tino rangatiratanga 
with the release, less than two months before elections 
were- scheduled to be held, of their proposals for 
recognition of the Treaty. The draft Bill for the 
.·, 
Establishment of Maori Advisory Committees in Local 
Government and Explanatory Statement was prepared for 
distribution for general comment and intended to cover: 
appropriate recognition of the Treaty; 
arrangements for direct Maori representation; and 
structural arrangements for consultation and Maori 
input. ( 103) 
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The public consultation round gave the first concrete 
opportunity for discussion of substantive issues regarding 
Maori representation, despite the attempt to constrain the 
debate to the proposal on offer from the Crown. In the 
Explanatory Statement the OCCLG explained that a mandatory 
consultative mechanism had been chosen as the model for 
Maori participation and would be "one of the means of 
facilitating recognition of the Treaty in local 
government", together with proposals for resource 
management consultation then being considered in Resource 
Management Law Reform. 
2 Maori Advisory Committees ("MAC's") 
The consultation mechanism elected by the OCCLG was a 
committee of appointed iwi representatives to be 
established within each territorial and regional authority. 
The Maori Advisory Committees were to have the power to 
consider and make recommendations on matters affecting 
Maori. Ultimately, their recommendations were subject to 
adoption, or rejection, by the elected representatives of 
the authority to whom decision-making power was reserved. 
Although in a number of instances, the provision for a 
mandatory consultation mechanism would have improved the 
. ( 
performance of many authorities in this area, for some, the 
proposal did not go as far as their own, already initiated, 
arrangements. Concern was expressed by these and other 
local government agencies during the submissions process 
that the draft Bill's mandatory principle did not afford 
sufficient flexibility for the development of solutions 
suitable to the individual circumstances of the region or 
district. Many authorities considered it more desirable to 
establish a discursive relationship with local tangata 
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whenua in order to determine the most appropriate and 
effective mechanism for their input. (104) 
"It will be an extremely difficult exercise to create, by a 
broad brush technique, one kind of mechanism which fits 
across the country. There are different concentrations of 
Maori people in different parts of the country, there is a 
different history of settlement of Maori people in 
different parts of the country, and the migration of Maoris 
(sic) within the country has meant that many of them are 
living in areas where their ancestors had no previous 
association." (105) 
Maori, in contrast, centred their opposition to the draft 
Bill on the mere advisory role given to MAC's. The draft 
Bil.!,:_ provided (106) for the MAC's to tender their advice o r 
recommendations to the elected authority who were then 
obliged to consider all "matters that it is required to 
consider or it considers relevant, {and to} have regard to 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." (107) 
The jurisdiction of the authority in this respect was 
extraordinarily wide, allowing the introduction of any 
number of related and ancillary matters, provided that the 
authority considered they were relevant to the case at ... 
hand. No right of appeal was provided for in the event that 
a local authority elected to overrule the advice of its 
MAC. As a result, the Bill was seen by most submissions 
from Maori (108) to offer no guarantee that MAC 
recommendations would be heard or acted upon by the 
authority. 
It could not, therefore, be regarded as having improved the 
situation with respect to the equitable distribution of 
decision-making power, or furthered the partnership 
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envisaged by the Treaty. A consultation mechanism without 
real decision-making capabilities was hardly an adequate 
expression of te tino rangatiratanga. Not only were Maori 
denied the right to make decisions on resources important 
to them, their expressions of cultural and customary 
preferences could be dismissed by the Pakeha power-holders 
for whatever reason they saw fit to apply. 
"Generally speaking, consultation is very one-sided. Maori 
do all the advocating by organising their information in a 
manner that is acceptable to the arbiters. The arbiters are 
invariably Pakeha or political creatures who exist by 
virtue of the Pakeha constituency. After the information 
has been produced and this small part of the process 
moderated, there is no guarantee that the outcome will 
reflect the interests of Maori." (109) 
Maori were also concerned that the MAC proposal would usurp 
the role of iwi runanga in representing the interests of 
the tangata whenua. A creation of Pakeha statute, existing 
only within the bounds of Pakeha institutions, ought not to 
be a substitute for adequate interface between the Crown's 
representatives and the runanga who are rightful and 
authoritative voice of iwi. In such circumstances, it would 
be undesirable ~to intrude into the direct relationship 
between authorities and runanga, except perhaps where, as 
with a number of regions, the boundaries of the authority 
transect the traditional territories of more than one 
tribal group. 
Even in such circumstances, the establishment of Maori 
Advisory Committees raises substantial mandate and 
accountability issues for the tangata whenua 
representatives. The right to portray the view of an iwi 
requires consensus support from that iwi, consensus which 
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can only be achieved, in most instances, through extensive 
discussion and debate on and around the marae in accordance 
with Maori protocol and tribal time frames. Invariably, the 
tangata whenua would incur costs in human and financial 
terms, whereas the time constraints under which the 
authority was required to operate may effectively limit the 
capacity of the MAC to provide sound, mandated advice. No 
attention was given to these matters by the draft Bill, a 
fact which further undermined the credibility of the 
proposal in light of Maori custom and practice. 
"[T]ikanga Maori is central to Maori consciousness. It has 
to be safeguarded. It should not be dismissed as 
impracticable or burdensome by local government. This will 
only lead to a further erosion of our heritage." (110) 
During the submissions analysis it became apparent that 
little thought had been given to the nature of the issues 
to be referred to MAC's and the resources to be allocated 
to them for their activities. (111) 
Under the draft Bill, the principle function of a MAC was 
to consider matters of concern to the tangata whenua and, 
if it wished, to make submissions to the authority on the 
appropriate policy to be followed. (112) Bridgeport states 
(113) that most of the comment on MAC functions centred 
around the issue of how matters of concern would be 
identified and referred. The majority of Pakeha submissions 
sought greater definition of the issues it could be 
expected would be of concern to tangata whenua, so as to 
ameliorate the possibility of conflict and inject greater 
certainty into the relationship between MAC's and Council, 
especially as regards access to Council documentation. 
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As the Hui on Maori Participation in Local Government had 
noted, if adequate care is not taken with the process for 
referral of information to committees established for the 
purpose of giving Maori input into policies and resource 
consent proposals, matters of importance will invariably be 
missed, leading to increased tension in the working 
relationship between MAC, iwi and Council. Significance 
cannot reliably be ascertained by other than the 
representatives of he tangata whenua, nor will the import 
of any given policy be necessarily apparent to Pakeha. 
Kerins has documented (114) the dangers associated with 
Pakeha "gate-keepers" being responsible for the 
transmission of information between Council and iwi 
Standing Committees. 
"The {Hawkes Bay Regional Council's} Maori Standing 
Committee as a consultative system operates on the premise 
that the Pakeha members of the Committee when advocating 
for Maori within the structure of regional government, will 
on the one hand, have-a diachronic (historical) perspective 
of Maori issues, and on the other will perform their role 
objectively - or free from personal prejudice. The system 
is built on the assumption that Council-Iwi relations 
operate within .,a political, social and cultural vacuum. " 
(115) 
Considering this, it would be reasonable to assume that 
those responsible for determining which issues were 
significant and warranted further attention, and which did 
not, would make such deliberations based on a sound 
knowledge of the Treaty, and the history, preferences and 
priorities of the tangata whenua. In reality, the only 
persons qualified to so decide must be the representatives 
of the tangata whenua themselves. 
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It is clear that the Hui on Maori Participation in Local 
Government had these issues firmly in mind in couching 
their recommendation to the Minister on the referral of 
information to Standing Committees established within local 
authorities. The purpose, it was said, of such Standing 
Committees shall be "to vet all the policies and activities 
of [the] authority". (116) 
The draft Bill also proposed (117) that MAC's should not be 
committees of the respective authority, a provision which 
was seen by Maori submissions to be an appropriate means of 
upholding the autonomy of the MAC and which would allow its 
operations to take more account of Maori protocols than 
would be possible were the authority's committee rules to 
apply. 
On the other hand, many local authorities expressed 
concerns about the lack of accountability which such 
autonomy implied, especially in light of the obligations of 
the Council to fund the MAC's activities. (118) 
3 Membership of Maori Advisory Committees 
The draft Bill .provided that the membership of MAC's would 
consist of people appointed from iwi groups represented 
within the region or district concerned. (119) This 
provision attracted substantial comment from authorities 
concerned that MAC membership should be extend beyond the 
tangata whenua to encompass representation of all Maori 
resident within their boundaries. This criticism applied 
particularly to the larger metropolitan areas. 
"Upper Hutt City Council notes that MAC membership should 
be representative of local Maori rather than be confined to 
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the tangata whenua of the area. There are no iwi within 
Upper Hutt that are recognised as tangata whenua of the 
City in its present form. They say that the Bill, as 
drafted, would result in a MAC being made up of Maori 
without direct interests in the Upper Hutt community to the 
exclusion of local Maori who are not tangata whenua." ( 120) 
As a result of such concerns, the submissions argued that 
membership should be on the basis of residence or land 
holding within the boundaries of the authority. 
In tikanga Maori terms, the role of taurahere or immigrant 
Maori is to support, rather than displace, the tangata 
whenua in their endeavours. This role becomes particularly 
significant where the management and control of natural 
resources are concerned. The local authority assertions 
with respect to representation for immigrant Maori 
fundamentally misinterprets the rationale for and role of 
the MAC. 
According to the draft Bill the purpose of establishing the 
MAC · s was: 
"To provide for consultation and discussion between Tangata 
Whenua and regional councils and territorial authorities." 
( 121) 
The motivation for the Bill, from a Maori perspective at 
least, was the Crown's obligations to recognise the special 
status to be accorded to the tangata whenua under the 
Treaty, and to give effect tote tino rangatiratanga. It 
was not intended, again from the Maori perspective, to 
redress the problem of minority representation in an 
elected democracy, per se. In fact, Maori advocates had 
resisted such a focus since it was first presented by the 
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Crown's representatives in the OCCLG Discussion Document, 
as it raised difficult and unpopular issues with respect t o 
other ethnic, cultural and gender-based minority views. 
More importantly, it derogated the status of the interests 
of the tangata whenua to those of any other 'special 
interest' group. 
On the other hand, many of the activities of the reformed 
local authorities will extend beyond natural resource 
management, to encompass wider socio-economic related 
out_c:;omes. In these matters, local immigrant Maori would be 
expected to have valuable input in terms of the needs and 
priorities of their own communities. Culturally appropriate 
community resource programmes, such as supporting kohanga 
reo and urban marae, are an example. In such instances, 
however, local authorities need to construct arrangements 
distinct from those which are established in recognition o f 
the interests of the tangata whenua under the Treaty. 
For some Maori making submissions, the question of MAC 
membership also raised issues of representation internally 
within the iwi, based largely on concern that existing iwi 
"authorities" such as tribal trust boards were arguably not 
representative of all tangata whenua interests. Some went 
so far as to suggest that powers of Ministerial appointment 
or review by other Pakeha institutions such as the Maori 
Land Court might be preferable in the event of conflict 
over membership. Notwithstanding these concerns, Bridgeport 
notes (122) that the majority of Maori submissions, 
including that of the Maori Local Government Reform 
Consultative Group, supported the appointment of MAC 
membership by iwi. 
The draft Bill's provision for a maximum membership of the 
MAC also attracted adverse comment in the submissions. 
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(123) Some authorities sought to further limit numbers to 
accord with precedent such as the community boards and put 
a lid on expenses which the authority would be expected to 
meet. For others flexibility was the key, as they 
considered that authorities should be empowered to 
construct the membership numbers to suit their own 
circumstances. In would be somewhat inequitable for smaller 
authorities, submitters noted, (124) to be required to 
establish and fund a MAC disproportionate in size to the 
authority itself, or to the numbers of Maori residing in 
the community. 
At the other end of the spectrum, uncertainty about the 
outcome of the Iwi Runanga legislation (125) also tended to 
suggest flexibility in numbers would be desirable. 
"The New Zealand Government Association says that the limit 
of ten members is too rigid. They say that, until the 
Runanga Iwi legislation is in place, it is impossible to 
tell how many iwi may ultimately incorporate. The 
Association notes that some regions may have more than 10 
iwi within their boundaries. A possible approach would be 
for the Bill to make provision for membership to be decided 
by negotiation between the iwi authorities and the local 
authority - providing that the membership of the MAC does 
not exceed the number of councillors on the local 
authority." ( 126) 
4 Conclusion 
The government's MAC proposal suffered from being a 
compromise between two diametrically opposed positions -
universal representation being pitted against the status 
conferred on Maori under the Treaty. As something of a 
predictable result, the proposal ended up satisfying no-one 
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in particular. It certainly failed to gain the support 
which it would have needed in order to overcome the heated 
resistent of some local authority advocates, and the 
reluctance of the government itself to promote Maori 
interests, apparent throughout the reform. 
The majority of submissions from Pakeha were in conflict 
with those received from Maori - for many authorities even 
a subordinate position for iwi within their structures was 
unacceptable without control over selection and conduct of 
the mechanism being vested in the authority. 
Those Maori who expressed guarded support for the 
initiative were obliged to qualify that support by their 
view of the MAC proposal as tokenism for failing to advance 
te tino rangatiratanga. The response of the Ngai Tahu Maori 
Trust Board (127) was typical: 
"Seeing that the Bill seems to be determined to ignore the 
Rangatiratanga principle inherent in Article II of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, ft is appropriate for us to state our 
opposition to it on that count. The practical business of 
living [however} suggests to us that it is desirable to 
salvage what can be salvaged from this inadequate treatment 
of the Treaty"., 
In fact, recognition of the Treaty itself, was scant in any 
form, being confined to an obligation to have regard to its 
principles in considering the advice from MAC's, a 
provision carefully designed to avoid making the Treaty a 
relevant consideration with respect to the administration 
of local government in general. 
" The submissions on the Maori Advisory Committee Bill 
reveal the conflict between tangata whenua groups and local 
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government. The submissions reveal Maori were past the 
stage of acting in an advisory position within monocultural 
Pakeha institutions. They were seeking an equal say in the 
decision-making process along with the Crown and stated 
that the Treaty of Waitangi was the charter for that 
relationship." (128) 
F RESULTS OF THE REFORM 
In December 1989, both the Iwi Runanga and Resource 
Management Bills were introduced to parliament. Although 
the timeframe for submissions to the draft Bill for 
establishment of MAC's had been delayed to allow 
submissions to take account of the contents of those bills, 
(129) considerable uncertainty remained as to the interface 
between the reforms. More importantly, the complexity and 
controversy surrounding RMLR and Iwi Runanga distracted the 
attention of both Maori advocates and Crown officials. In 
the ensuing melee, the Local Government Reform (No 8) Bill 
slipped quietly into oblivion. It was never revived. 
It found a small legacy, however, in the establishment in a 
number of, primarily, regional authorities of Maori 
Standing Committees and other consultative mechanisms. 
(130) The proposal therefore served a purpose of raising 
the awareness of local government and increasing their 
acceptance of the need to improve their performance on 
consultation with Maori. 
Local government reform reduced more than 800 authorities 
to 93, 13 at the regional level and the remainder concerned 
with districts. These authorities have wide ranging 
responsibility for the control and management of all 
natural and physical resources in New Zealand. (131) 
Regional Councils and territorial authorities continue to 
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be directly elected. Their boundaries were determined on 
the basis of whole water catchments (Regional Councils) or 
the bounds of cities, or old boroughs and counties 
(territorial authorities). 
As far as consultation with Maori goes, Councils continue 
to be able to exercise the powers they held prior to the 
review - to appoint Standing Committees for special 
purposes from their elected ranks onto which may be co-
opted non-elected representatives as the Council sees fit. 
Those Maori Standing Committees, even where established, do 
not -have the powers of most other Standing Committees in 
that they are reliant on elected representatives' 
advocating for their recommendations to be accepted by the 
authority, as non-elected persons may not exercise any 
decision-making power. 
Far from improving the situation with regard to the 
representation of Maori and Treaty interests, local 
government reform can be regarded as having worsened the 
Maori position. The amalgamation which the Local Government 
Commission schemes entailed served to further distance the 
operation of local government from the communities they 
serve. Increases in Council territorial areas did not 
necessarily result in increased opportunities for 
interested persons to gain election to them. Instead, Maori 
candidates, still handicapped by a dearth of resources and 
a hostile majority, must now compete for fewer places in 
order to exercise any real decision-making power. 
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G RESOURCE MANAGEMENT LAW REFORM 
1 Introduction 
Concurrently with announcement of the impending local 
government reform, the Minister for the Environment 
announced government's intention to undertake a 
comprehensive review of resource management law with an 
objective of integrating land use planning statutes, water 
and soil conservation legislation, the law relating to 
minerals and environmental assessment procedures. 
To quote the then Minister for the Environment introducing 
the third reading of the Bill: 
11 We run a much more liberal market economy these days. 
Economic and social outcomes are in the hands of the 
citizens to a much greater extent than they have 
previously been. The Government's focus is now on 
externalities - the effects of those activities on the 
receiving environment - and those effects have too 
often been ignored. 11 
Accordingly, processes established by the Act were intended 
to enable communities to find the least cost means of 
securing maximum benefit from resources subject only to 
certain environmental constraints and the obligation to 
accommodate a number of values which were too important to 
be left to the vagaries of majority rule democracy (132) In 
this respect, the government accepted that their Treaty 
obligations required that the Act give status to Maori 
values and concepts and provide express opportunities for 
Maori participation. (133) 
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The government established the following guidelines as the 
basis for the reform: (134) 
a The primary goal for government involvement in 
resource allocation and management is to produce an 
enhanced quality of life, both for individuals and the 
community as a whole through the allocation and 
management of natural and physical resources. 
b Resource management legislation should have regard to 
the following, sometimes conflicting, objectives: 
i to distribute rights to resources in a just 
manner, taking into account the rights of 
existing right holders and the obligations of the 
Crown. The legislation should also give 
practical effect to the principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi; 
ii to ensure that resources provide the greatest 
benefit to society. This requires that rights to 
use or conserve resources are able to move over 
time to uses in which they are valued most 
highly, and that the least-cost way is adopted to 
achieve this transfer; 
iii to ensure good environmental management, which 
includes considering the needs of future 
generations, the intrinsic value of ecosystems, 
and sustainability; 
iv to be practical. 
Property rights were an important part of the reform. The 
market could take care of many resource conflicts, but it 
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was unable to protect certain important values, such as 
future generations, Treaty issues, intrinsic values, and 
third party impacts. 
The RMA was intended to operate in tandem with the 
extensive reforms to local and regional government. It was 
not intended to be operate as a panacea for a lack of 
structural representation for Maori. 
2 Representation 
The Resource Management Act deals in a number of Maori 
representative forms, requiring consultation and protection 
of the interests of the tangata whenua (the people holding 
customary authority over the area), (135) while creating 
obligations to confer with iwi authorities in the 
preparation of plans, (136) the notification of consents 
and the transfer of powers and functions. (137) 
Uncertainty about representation of iwi for the purposes of 
the Resource Management Act had been intended to be 
resolved by the recognition of specific iwi authorities 
pursuant to the Runanga Iwi Act 1990. Unfortunately, the 
repeal of that Act created certain practical difficulties 
for local authorities who find the pluralism of Maori 
society and the number of tribal voices a source of 
confusion and uncertainty. 
At present, wiser decision-makers generally avoid 
accidental interference in Maori political processes by 
consulting as widely as possible. Others seek to choose who 
to consult with, often with a view to avoiding strong 
tribal advocates. Ultimately, tensions between Maori 
development and protection objectives are likely to force 
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some kind of legal resolution, the nature of which remains 
to be seen. 
3 Ownership of Resources 
Early in the RMLR exercise it became clear to government 
that Maori were seeking a comprehensive change to political 
and economic arrangements for the allocation, management 
and control of natural resources as a pre-condition for 
effective Maori participation. In particular, Maori 
fundamentally challenged the right of the Crown to devolve 
management responsibilities to regional and local 
government as failing to recognise that ownership rights to 
the resources were guaranteed to Maori by the Treaty of 
Waitangi and had been wrongfully subsumed to the Crown in 
breach of its provisions. (138) 
The government recognised that several iwi had lodged 
claims with the Waitangi Tribunal relating to the ownership 
of resources. At the same time, market-oriented interests 
were seeking the privatisation of all natural resources. 
Recognising that the implications of the Treaty for the 
ownership and management of resources were complex and 
controversial, the government determined that they would 
require a careful case by case approach which could not be 
appropriately undertaken in the process of RMLR. 
Delighted to be able to deflect the privatisation lobby, 
(139) the government therefore decided that the Resource 
Management Law Reform was not the appropriate place to 
resolve issues of title, that entitlements would therefore 
not be altered by the Act nor issues relating to Maori 
ownership of resources dealt with in the reform. The 
government did note, however, support for the establishment 
and strengthening of arrangements to enable the Crown and 
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Maori to resolve outstanding ownership conflicts through 
negotiation. (140) 
One result of this decision was that sole rights to 
allocate water resources continued to be vested with the 
Crown. 
H THE RMLR PROCESS 
1 Introduction 
In dramatic contrast to the local government review, 
Resource Management Law Reform reflected Government's 
commitment to a rights-based approach to responding to the 
Crown's obligations to actively protect Maori and Treaty 
interests as a fundamental tenet of the reform. The reform 
was centred on an over-arching commitment to wide-ranging, 
intensive and well-resourced consultation in the 
preparation of proposals for reform. (141) 
2 Resourcing of Maori Participation 
The Resource Management Law Reform was notable for the 
provision of a -, range of alternate mechanisms for Maori 
participation in the process that were more effective and 
responded appropriately to Maori cultural preferences, 
particularly with respect to oral communication and 
timeframes for consensus decision-making. These mechanisms 
included: 
- an intensive set of meetings conducted according to Maori 
protocol held at traditional community meeting places 
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- an open-door policy on accepting and incorporating 
submissions at any time in the review that more easily 
accommodate tribal timeframes 
- provision of a free phone service for recording of oral 
submissions 
- comprehensive funding and human resource assistance to 
tribal organisations for the preparation of written 
submissions 
- meeting of personal and travel costs of participants in 
hui (142) 
Formal structural arrangements for advocating Maori 
interests were also important to the successful integration 
of those interests in all aspects of the reform. The 
Government established a Core Group of four people charged 
with coordinating the RMLR process, including one charged 
with facilitating consid~ration of the Treaty. 
The RMLR consultation exercise was the largest and most 
comprehensive process for participation by Maori in the 
formulation of policy and law ever undertaken by the New 
Zealand government. It engendered an exceptional response 
from Maori which served to further underline the 
interrelationship between the integrity of resources and 
the environment and the social, cultural, economic, 
physical and spiritual wellbeing of Maori communities. It 
also raised Maori expectations for the integration of their 
concerns to an unprecedented level. 
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I POWER AND AUTHORITY UNDER THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT 
1991 
1 The Principles 
The Resource Management Act introduced to law a number of 
positive obligations on decision-makers to deal 
specifically with a range of Maori value-systems and 
interests. These include: 
- A requirement to recognise and provide for the 
relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with 
their ancestral lands, water, sites, wahi tapu and other 
taonga (143) 
- A requirement to have particular regard to kaitiakitanga 
(144) 
- A requirement to take into account the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (145) 
- A requirement to state resource management issues of 
significance to tribal authorities in Regional Policy 
Statements; (146) and 
.·,-
- Multiple requirements to consult and inform tribal 
organisations in the preparation of plans and policy 
statements and with respect to all consent applications 
(147) 
The ancestral relationship provision has been carried over 
from the old Town and Country Planning Act regime, (148) 
and is the only provision dealing with Maori or Treaty 
interests with any substantial judicial history. Held by 
I 
the Planning Tribunal for the first 11 years of its 
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legislative existence to be limited land, being Maori land 
or Maori freehold land, continuously and currently owned by 
Maori and associated with the burial of ancestors, (149) 
the term "ancestral land" was finally determined by the 
High Court to apply much more widely to lands concerning 
which a variety of cultural and/or historical associations 
might be held by the tangata whenua. (150) 
As that which is to be recognised and provided for is a 
relationship, there must be a nexus apparent between that 
relationship, the customs and traditions which might 
reasonably apply to the circumstances and the proposed use 
of the land. (151) 
Kaitiakitanga represents a complex set of rules and beliefs 
about the nature of human responsibilities to the natural 
world, based on reciprocity and kinship, concepts of 
guardianship and an ethical obligation to act to protect 
the integrity of resources in stewardship for future 
generations. (152) Its incorporation into statute has great 
potential, offering some authority for the notion that 
Maori environmental knowledge and practice should make an 
integral contribution to decision-making. 
Notwithstanding Maori preferences for direct enactment of 
the terms of the Treaty, its principles are a powerful 
vehicle for the introduction of Maori cultural concepts of 
authority (rangatiratanga) and value (taonga) into 
statutory resource management. (153) The principles are 
based on an exchange of rights which allows Government to 
set policy, objectives and rules for the conservation of 
natural resources, subject to the obligation to actively 
protect Maori rights to self-regulation. They are also 
premised on the establishment of a decision-making 
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partnership between Crown and Maori, characterised by good 
faith, reasonable co- operation and mutual compromise.(154) 
Each of these provisions is subject to limiting judicial 
interpretation and restrictions on the weight to be 
accorded it in comparison to other priorities. Taken 
together, however, they confer strong statutory authority 
for the elimination of planning and policy impediments to 
the capacity of Maori to identify with and enjoy their 
lands and other significant resources . 
2 Mechanisms For Decision-Making By Maori 
(a) Introduction 
Maori participation under the Resource Management Act 1991 
will always be limited by the failure of local government 
reform to provide for any structural recognition of the 
right of the tangata whenua to exercise te tino 
rangatiratanga, and accordingly, to decide how and for what 
purposes resources are to be managed and used . 
Of itself, the Resource Management Act can do little to 
improve that situation as ultimate decision-making 
authority continues to reside with the elected, invariably 
Pakeha authorities. That fact notwithstanding, the Act does 
provide for certain opportunities for Maori participation, 
limited by the statutory mandate, and the willingness of 
often unwilling local authority representatives to give 
full effect to the intent of the provisions. 
(b) Transfer of Functions 
The Act permits extensive delegation of Council functions 
through transfer to public authorities whose definition 
-52-
includes tribal authorities. (155) Councils remain 
responsible for the exercise of the delegated functions. In 
theory, tribal organisations should be able to seek an 
active role in management through transfer of relevant 
local authority functions, including the power to make 
decisions on resource consent applications. 
The power of delegation depends, however, on a number of 
criteria including efficiency, adequate representation of a 
community of interest and the possession of technical or 
special capability or expertise. In reality, the decisions 
are likely to be firmly based on fiscal and political 
conditions. Under-resourced tribal organisations are likely 
to find it difficult to establish the criteria and generate 
the political will needed for a successful delegation. 
(c) Resource Consents 
The Act does not explicitly provide for Maori to make, or 
necessarily to have a significant share in the making of, 
decisions on the allocation of resources, other than when 
powers are transferred to an iwi authority under section 33 
of the Act. 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that it is outside 
the powers of Councils to make provision and recognition 
for tangata whenua input into decision making with respect 
to particular resources in their policies and plans. 
The issue of how a Council should take into account the 
principles of the Treaty is a matter for their discretion. 
It is arguable, therefore, that the principle that iwi have 
the right to exercise rangatiratanga over their resources 
requires a recognition of their input into decisions made 
affecting those resources. 
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This view only consider the provisions of the Act, however, 
and there are other legal principles which apply, 
principally the principles of natural justice and fairness. 
These become relevant for two reasons. 
First, Councils will need to ensure that its treatment of 
other parties involved in the processes is fair and 
reasonable. 
Second, Councils will need to be wary of involving tangata 
whenua in decisions where they have a vested interest in 
the outcome. That is, where they are making submissions on 
consents. This creates a tautologous difficulty. By the 
very nature of the issues involved, tangata whenua will 
generally be concerned with input into decision making 
where their interests are affected, for example where a 
consent is likely to affect their relationship with taonga, 
prejudice a Treaty claim, or fail to regard mana whenua, 
for example. In such a case it would be contrary to the 
rules of natural justice to have the tangata whenua given a 
right of "veto" on consents. 
(d) Heritage Protection Authorities 
., 
The RMA expressly provides for the protection of heritage 
places of special spiritual, cultural or historical 
significance to the tangata whenua. It also establishes a 
process for iwi authorities to apply to the Minister for 
the Environment for approval to act as a Heritage 
Protection Authority with respect to any place they have an 
interest in protecting. Although the Minister may refuse an 
application on public interest grounds and serious cost 
implications apply, these provisions represent a mqjor 
improvement in the institutional ability of Maori to act to 
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themselves define and seek to protect the places important 
to them, albeit subject to the purpose and principles of 
the Act. 
(e) Consultation 
As a vehicle for the integration of Maori perspectives in 
decisions, consultation should ideally be measured by 
tangible results that go beyond the mere seeking of advice . 
In the past, Maori views expressed in consultation have 
been too frequently ignored in the final decision. If the 
consultation requirements of the Resource Management Act 
are to succeed in establishing a partnership between Maori 
and consent agencies, those agencies will need to recognise 
the special status afforded to indigenous Maori under the 
Act as more than "just another interest group". 
Even if this recognition is forthcoming, there will 
continue to be serious limitations on the extent to which 
consultation mechanisms can provide the kind of proactive 
participation that Maori have and will continue to seek in 
the management of their resources. Ultimate authority for 
making the decisions is not vested in Maori. 
Resourcing of tribal authorities to fulfil consultation 
functions is also a serious problem, identified as a major 
barrier to effective participation under the Act. (156) 
Tribal authorities are often very poorly resourced in both 
human and financial terms. The emphasis on written material 
and the tight timeframes prescribed under the Act (157) 
require levels of expertise and administrative organisation 
which most tribal authorities are not resourced to provide . 
Jrtant 
s of 
y 
~dvice . 
~ve 
f the 
Act 
Maori 
cognise 
r the 
which 
~tive 
eek in 
y for 
ion 
major 
56) 
n both 
aterial 
57) 
isation 
rovide . 
-55-
(f) Iwi Resource Management Plans 
The RMA obliges Councils to have regard to relevant 
planning documents recognised by iwi authorities in the 
preparation or change of plans and policy statements. (158) 
In so doing, the Act has provided an important impetus to 
the application of modern and traditional planning 
techniques to contemporary Maori resource management. The 
duty to have regard to such plans is, however, weak, and 
little recourse remains to iwi who feel that their 
objectives having been given insufficient consideration. 
The focus and contents of such planning documents are 
matters for autonomous decision by Maori. They are rarely 
limited to matters under consideration in the Act, 
frequently including development strategies and initiatives 
for restoring tribal economic bases, as well as detailing 
and prescribing requirements on cultural and spiritual 
values. Although the weakness of the duty on local 
government cannot ensure the integration of iwi planning 
objectives, the facil1ty for recognition of iwi management 
plans has potential as a mechanism for proactive Maori 
input and affirmation of the rights of the tangata whenua 
to act on and influence the management of natural resources 
important to their communities. 
J CONCLUSION 
The 1987-1990 reform of local government arrangements has 
been described as the most Treaty-inconsistent of all of 
the then Labour governments policy reviews. (159) 
Certainly, Maori expectations for the recognition of their 
tangata whenua status and rights to exercise te tino 
rangatiratanga were not met by a process which marginalised 
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the Treaty at every step. Although the end result - the 
demise of the draft Local Government Reform (No 8) Bill, 
was contributed to by the dominance of the Iwi Runanga and 
Resource Management reforms in Maori public and political 
arena, it was also a reflection of the impossible task of 
reconciling two fundamentally conflicting views about the 
place of the Treaty in the operations of New Zealand local 
government. 
At one end of the spectrum stood the guardians of electoral 
democracy, the philosophical basis on which local 
government is established, whose foundation is principles 
of universal franchise that invariably result in the 
subsuming of minority interests to those of the majority in 
pursuit of the "greatest good for the greatest number". 
(160) Under such principles, the idea of special or 
distinct representation for any one "special interest 
group" has the effect of creating a reprehensible and 
discriminatory privilege. 
This view on the question of what account should be taken 
of the Treaty, and what arrangements should be made forte 
tino rangatiratanga, was promulgated from the outset of the 
reform by the Crown's representatives, a position from 
which the Crown was ill inclined to subsequently retreat, 
representing, as it undoubtedly did, the majority Pakeha 
view. As a result, the government's tokenistic proposal for 
the establishment of Maori Advisory Committees was poorly 
thought out and found predictably little support. 
The opposing view is based firmly on the guarantees 
implicit in Articles I and II of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
that the Crown would not exercise its power to govern for 
the good of all so as to derogate from the rights of iwi to 
manage their resources according to their own cultural 
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priorities and customary preferences, nor avoid these 
obligations by conferring an inconsistent jurisdiction on 
its local government agents. 
"Maori people are tangata whenua of Aotearoa. They have a 
rangatira status guaranteed by Te Tiriti O Waitangi and yet 
they have been subordinated in the political and 
administrative life of local government since its inception 
in 1876." (161) 
Local government reform sought to rationalise and 
strengthen local government arrangements through, inter 
alia, amalgamation of some 800 territorial and special 
purpose authorities into 87 Regional, District and City 
Councils, to increase efficiency and accountability and to 
devolve power to the appropriate level of government having 
regard to function and community of interest. In contrast 
to RMLR, Maori interests were not given substantive 
priority from the outset of the local government review, 
nor reflected in decisions identifying the appropriate 
communities of interest. The resourcing and conduct of 
consultation processes generally reflected the low priority 
afforded these concerns. 
The reform highlighted the difficulty of reconciling 
differing cultural approaches to political authority. The 
Maori preference is for appointing representatives by 
consensus and debate. These processes conflict 
fundamentally with notions of universal franchise that are 
the basis of elected government. 
Ultimately, solutions to these conflicts proved elusive and 
attention shifted to interim solutions seeking a more 
secure form of Maori participation to compensate for the 
unbalancing effects of ordinary election processes and give 
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effect to the Crown's Treaty guarantees. A variety of 
arrangements were proposed for securing Maori structural 
participation including conferring a statutory obligation 
on Councils to establish Maori Advisory Standing Committees 
with solely advisory functions. 
In the event, however, the resulting legislation did not 
provide for any explicit participation by Maori in local 
government decision-making outside of the usual electoral 
process. This failure had important implications for the 
adequacy of Maori participation in resource management 
processes. With a few notable exceptions, Maori candidates 
for election to local government are rarely successful, 
especially where they openly advocate for Maori or Treaty 
interests. In the New Zealand local government system, 
elected councillors have ultimate authority for decision-
making and are rarely inclined to devolve that authority to 
others. 
As a result, the inclusion of Maori issues in Council 
processes is generally controlled by non-Maori gatekeepers, 
responsible for presenting Maori views and advocating for 
the desired decisions. Maori do not have the institutional 
ability to represent their own objectives directly in 
decision-making fora. 
The absence of any recognition in the empowering Local 
Government Act, even a token one, that Maori represent a 
distinct constituency whose rights and interests must be 
accorded priority, is a sorry commentary on the commitment 
of successive governments to their obligations under the 
Treaty. It has proven to be a significant limiting factor 
in the administration of the Resource Management Act 1991, 
whose promotion of Maori and Treaty interests cannot 
compensate for or overcome the lack of concrete 
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representation afforded to Maori within the structures of 
local government . 
"If the Treaty is to become a more significant part of 
regional and local government in the future, a 
decentralised approach (that is, from central government) 
to advise on Treaty obligations, needs to be established at 
the local government level, to ensure that local government 
performs in accordance with Treaty obligations." (162) 
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Pakeha. For this reason, inter alia, no glossary of Maori terms 
has been included in this paper. Persons seeking Pakeha 
translations are recommende~ to refer to Williams Dictionary of 
the Maori Language (Government Printer, Wellington, 1971) 
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inconsistent jurisdiction on others. See eg The Mohaka River 
Report (Waitangi Tribunal Division, Department of Justice, 
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